Subscribe for Newsletters and Discounts. Be the first to receive our thoughtfully written religious articles and product discounts.
Share our website with your friends. Studies in Comparative Philosophy. Item Code:. The Divine Life Society. Viewed times since 25th Jun, Introduction It has been said that there is a radical difference between the Western and the Eastern methods of approach in the pursuit of philosophy. Western philosophers are generally distinguished from the Eastern by their exclusively rational approach to the ultimate reality of the universe and in their paying not much attention to or being totally indifferent to the method of intuition.
Some historians of western philosophy have gone even to the extent of dobbing all Eastern thought as shot through with faith and not deserving of inclusion in such a chronicle.
No doubt there were some exceptionally great mystics in the West too, who proclaimed the possibility of an intuitional approach to Truth by transcending the realms of sense, understanding and reason.
But they were mostly the targets of suspicion and a superior attitude on the part of the logical thinkers. On a study of the history of philosophy in the west we come across variegated types of philosophers who made diverse approaches to the problems of life and established several schools of philosophy which generally comprehend vast fields of observation investigation and research such as logic, epistemology metaphysics aesthetics ethics psychology and mysticism.
Knowledge is neither Western nor Eastern but universal. It is also not true that the Indian philosophers abrogated reason as absolutely futile though they emphasized its natural limits. There are certain schools in India which establish their systems exclusively on rational grounds without discrediting the value and need of intuition in any way. In our study of philosophy, we may make use of methods and conclusions of the systems of the West in gaining mastery over the philosophies of Indian seers and sages.
The philosophy of the Vedanta is characterized by integrality in its meaning methods and scope, built on the foundations of the most incisive logical analysis and it rejects nothing as totally useless though it accepts nothing without sifting it through the sieve of direct experience in super-sensuous intuition.
It would certainly add to our knowledge to make a comparative study of the philosophies of some of the great Western thinkers and of philosophy of the Vedanta which is the culmination of Indian Thought. We may begin with the great Greek sage Socrates. We are happy to bring these writings together in a single volume now for the benefit of the interested readers.
Based on your browsing history. Please wait.The ambition and challenge of comparative philosophy is to include all the philosophies of global humanity in its vision of what is constituted by philosophy. This approach distinguishes comparative philosophy from several other approaches to philosophy.
First, comparative philosophy is distinct from both area studies philosophy in which philosophers investigate topics in particular cultural traditions, for example, Confucianism and world philosophy in which philosophers construct a philosophical system based on the fullness of global traditions of thought.
Second, comparative philosophy differs from more traditional philosophy in which ideas are compared among thinkers within a particular tradition; comparative philosophy intentionally compares the ideas of thinkers of very different traditions, especially culturally distinct traditions. With the unique approach of comparative philosophy also comes unique difficulties and challenges that are not as characteristic of doing philosophy within a particular tradition.
Current Issue: Volume 11, Issue 1 (2020)
Furthermore, since comparative philosophy involves an approach that is not dominant in academic philosophy, it has been somewhat neglected by the mainstream of the profession. However, comparative philosophy is fairly early in its developmental stages. Comparative philosophy—sometimes called cross-cultural philosophy—is a subfield of philosophy in which philosophers work on problems by intentionally setting into dialogue sources from across cultural, linguistic, and philosophical streams.
Comparative philosophers most frequently engage topics in dialogue between modern Western for example, American and Continental European and Classical Asian for example, ChineseIndianor Japanese traditions, but work has been done using materials and approaches from Islamic and African philosophical traditions as well as from classical Western traditions for example, JudaismChristianityPlatonism.
It is important to distinguish comparative philosophy from both area studies philosophy and world philosophy.
Unlike comparative philosophy, in area studies philosophy, the focus is on a single region. Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, and African philosophy are examples of area studies philosophy fields, in which the work done need not be comparative. Area studies philosophers do not necessarily compare the texts and thinkers with which they work with any ideas outside of the circumscribed area.
For example, Chinese philosophers may study Confuciusvarious forms of Confucianism, criticisms of Confucianism in Chinese Daoism and Buddhismand even Confucianism in the contemporary world, but they need not make any attempt to compare Confucian thought with philosophical texts and thinkers from other cultures.
For this reason, the bibliography to the present entry does not have categories that fit area studies philosophy rather than comparative philosophy. World philosophy, like area studies philosophy, should be distinguished from comparative philosophy.
World philosophy may be thought of as an effort at constructive philosophy that takes into account the great variety of philosophical writings and traditions across human cultures and endeavors to weave them into a coherent world view.
As such, it is an extension of comparative philosophy, because comparison is fundamental to the constructivist task.
But comparative philosophy need not become world philosophy. The comparative philosopher may be working on isolated topics, or with two or more philosophers, just for the sake of gaining clarity on some specific issue.
Likewise, those wanting to construct a world philosophy often find a place for the thought of other traditions in the system they construct, but it is fair to wonder whether they really allow the voice of the other to express itself in its strongest form.
Comparative philosophy as cross-cultural philosophy is a relative newcomer to the field of philosophy. It has its antecedents in the Western awareness of different traditions, especially Asian ones, in the eighteenth century. Much of the work done during this period and just afterward does not conform to the definition of comparative philosophy outlined above.
As Jonathan Spence has pointed out, the earliest treatments of China by Western philosophers, such as that of Hegelreally cannot properly be called comparative philosophy because they lack any serious engagement from the Chinese side.We live in multicultural, multiethnic, cosmopolitan worlds. Different traditions rest on different philosophies — different metaphysics, epistemologies, and ethics, sometimes differe nt views of the nature of persons and the human good.
Understanding alternative philosophies that are lived by different people is a necessary condition for tolerant living. But more importantly it is a wonderful tool for philosophical imagination, for exploring the resources in other traditions for better thinking about the nature of things, human knowledge, the good life, and politics. The Center works to bring distinguished scholars who work in comparative philosophy to Duke, to hold seminars and roundtables and to teach classes on cross-cultural philosophy, and to produce scholarship that advances cross-cultural philosophy.
Our current interests and talents are primarily in Chinese and Indian philosophy. But we are branching out at every opportunity and recently completed and new projects involve work in African, Amerindian, and Islamic philosophies. Please read the Duke Wordpress Policies. Contact the Duke WordPress team. Center for Comparative Philosophy Duke University. Search Search.The Comparative Philosophy Seminar seeks to advance constructive philosophical projects by bringing together scholars with training in diverse areas of Asian mostly Buddhist thought and Western Philosophy.
Comparison in this context is not employed to loan authority to one set of obscure discoveries by revealing its resonances with the works of others, deemed less obscure.
Nor does it sociologize philosophy in search of general laws of human cultural and intellectual development. Rather, the intent is to explicate, and employ, the fullness of an expanded philosophical toolset—and see how that works. The seminar ordinarily invites respondents who are versed in the relevant field of philosophical inquiry, but who are not necessarily specialists in Asian thought.
In order to facilitate an ongoing conversation, seminar meetings for a given year are loosely organized around a very general theme, which speakers are asked to address when possible. Co-Chairs Professor Jonathan C. Gold jcgold princeton. Professor Hagop Sarkissian hagop. Rapporteur Verena Meyer vhm columbia. Meeting dates and locations are subject to change. Please confirm details with the seminar rapporteur.
This is to be contrasted with holding a view or belief based primarily on the authority or expertise of others, without seeing for oneself that the view is correct or why it is correct. The Chinese philosophical tradition is rich in discussion of the nature, value, and function of deliberative autonomy, having much to say both in its defense and against it.
The philosophical and psychological literature on well-being tend to focus on the prudential value of positive emotions such as pleasure, joy, or gratitude. But how do the negative emotions such as grief fit into our understanding of well-being? It is often assumed that negative emotions are intrinsically bad far us and that we should work toward eliminating them, especially from the perspective of our own well-being.
In this presentation I want to question this assumption by drawing on the ideas of Zhuangzi a prominent early Daoist thinker from the 4th Century BCE to argue that negative emotions are not intrinsically bad for us, and that their prudential value or disvalue is context dependent. Zhuangzi's outlook, with his focus on the flexibility of perspectives and living according to our natural, spontaneous inclinations, gives us reason to reconsider the role of negative emotions in our lives and how we might think about them in a more constructive way.
Recently, a group of scholars has challenged the moral legitimacy of Confucian democracy from a liberal philosophical standpoint. This will be the third and, time permitting, some material from the fourth of a series of lectures that I aim to write up formally as a book.
We will begin with a brief review of the most familiar theory of Chinese aesthetics: works of art are the products of sensitive human beings who cannot suppress their sincere responses to emotional stimuli. Art is thus timeless and offers the possibility of incorporeal immortality.
If there is extra time, I will also survey two interrelated phenomena that I call meta-criticism and meta-writing since there are no technical terms for them in Chinese.
Ethnophilosophy: A Renaissance?
Meta-criticism, i. Meta-criticism must be related to meta-writing, or the practice of writing about writing while exemplifying the very styles and techniques that one recommends: for example, artfully rhyming a couplet about rhyming.
This talk places master-student relations in the context of Confucian social theory, focusing on issues of obedience, remonstration, and respect for different sorts of authorities. I survey early Confucian accounts of the good society centered on role relations, personal development, and flourishing, both individual and communal. I then examine the question of autonomy within these relationships, looking closely at remonstration, obedience, and disobedience.
The talk concludes with a broader discussion of human dependence, placing Confucian conceptions in dialogue with Eva Feder Kittay, Martha Fineman, and Alasdair MacIntyre. All three, like the Confucians, see dependency relations as central to human life and the problems of politics, in sharp contrast to most liberal views that imagine a social contract between autonomous, free, and equal individuals.
Confucians view extreme dependence as a special case of the pervasive interdependence of all human beings on each other, with family relations serving in many respects as the model for other relations. Despite contemporary American resistance to dependence as servile and thus incompatible with freedom and autonomydysfunctional, or lazy, it is an essential condition of human life. None of us could flourish or even survive without care, assistance, and cooperation from others, especially in childhood and old age but also throughout the whole lifespan.
As these Confucians argue, dependence on other people is socially and individually good: it satisfies our strong desires for connection to others, as well as many of our other desires, through the practices supported and wealth produced and distributed through efficient, just social cooperation.
Furthermore, despite contemporary American suspicions to the contrary, deference to experts and even to other social authorities is often good. And general social deference smooths social relations and helps society function, as long as people perform their role-specific duties well.
To extinguish dukkha requires that we be able to extinguish the illusion of self. For that reason both early and later forms of Buddhism developed a set of arguments to demonstrate that the idea of the self is an illusion.
I will begin this talk with a brief review of some of the arguments, but I will then proceed to show that these arguments are not themselves sufficient to dispel the illusion.Ethnophilosophy, Comparative Philosophy, Pragmatism: Toward a Philosophy of Ethnoscapes Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, Associate Researcher In this essay I would like to reflect on the place of philosophy within a "globalized" world and reconsider its status as a phenomenon that is potentially linked to a "local" culture.
Whenever we question the authority of "general" truths and we look for ways of integrating "local discourses" into the overall construction called "global philosophy," we come across the old idea of "ethnophilosophy. I will sketch an approach that I believe to be appropriate for the development of philosophy in times of globalization.
One of the negative undertones of the term "globalization" is that it is seen as a uniformizing and flattening power that eliminates existing cultural differences. On the other hand, there is an important side effect of globalization represented by those movements acting against it, stressing the importance of "localization" or "regionalization.
When it is formulated in a radical fashion it has to face the reproach of relativism and of enclosing itself in a cultural sphere that it declares to be inaccessible to others. Ethnophilosophy was developed in Africa in the s, although its origin can be traced back to a book on Bantu philosophy by the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels. In this book, published inTempels tried to conclude with the view that primitive peoples have neither ontology nor logic and are unable to recognize the nature of being or even of reality as such.
Tempels was looking for an ontology colored by "local" cultural components but also by language, 1 and he made a serious attempt to build a philosophical system based on Bantu thought. What followed were endless controversies about the nature of African philosophy that made of "ethnophilosophy" a stream of thought much richer than its name might allow one to suppose. A part of its stimulating power can perhaps be traced to the ambiguity of Tempels' approach: on the one hand it could easily be dismissed as paternalism or the attempt to force African philosophy into the straightjacket of European concepts, while on the other hand the expressed desire to give "ethnic" [End Page ] philosophy a new role within the international hierarchy of the philosophies was immensely attractive.
Be that as it may, Tempels' book became the real manifest of "ethnophilosophy. Another point at issue that spurned internal ethnophilosophical discussions was the question whether African philosophy is advanced by an entire people that is, by a collective or by individual philosophers.
This question which does not arise in Tempels' book was first taken up by the Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji, 2 who claimed that ethnophilosophy is no philosophy at all because it remains indifferent toward individually critical, that is, typically philosophicalapproaches. Related debates touch upon fundamental questions concerning the meaning of "collective thinking" or the nature of philosophy as such.
However subtle the points may be that emerge from these discussions, for the outside observer ethnophilosophy appears to be a kind of anthropology whose premises it continues to share with an incorporated interest in metaphysical questions.
Its opposite is "conventional" Western philosophy, which persistently explores truth with the help of a single, individual mindaiming at the crystallization of a truth relevant for everybody. What matters for ethnophilosophy is the truth brought forward by a certain way of life of a group of people that can be found on the "inside" of a culture and that can exist independently of any considerations of those things that exist on the outside. Ethnophilosophy is radical in the sense that it not only aims to reestablish, through its opposition to the all-intruding "international" philosophy, its own philosophy within the borders of a certain nation; going much further than many of today's opponents of globalization would dare to go, ethnophilosophy thinks of philosophy Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide.Theory and History of Ontology by Raul Corazzon e-mail: rc ontology.
Ontology - Mirror Website. The purpose of these pages is to give both the beginner and the more experienced reader a brief guide to the literature on ontology and logic available in non-Western traditions. This is an important and original, but often neglected, subject and I will made an attempt to list the more important studies of African, Buddhist, Chinese, Indian and Arabic traditions that are available in English.
In its initial form the page will contain a selection of readings, with brief annotations on the content for the most important books, also the index will be included ; subsequently these will be expanded to include more specific essays on selected problems and the most relevant studies in French, Italian and German. This is a very hard job and will require a long amount of time to be completed; suggestions and criticisms will be particularly welcome. In the sections for beginners, preference will be given to those books more readily available.
In other sections some books could be out of print; if your Library does not possess the volume, it may be possible to obtain it via interlibrary loan. Every effort will be made to provide details that facilitate bibliographical research. It could not have come into existence before intellectually significant contacts among the philosophical traditions.
China had such a contact with India during the early centuries of the Christian era, mainly through Buddhism; but India remained unaffected. Between Greece and India the encounter was sporadic and short-lived; neither made a deliberate attempt to study the other.
But the world situation has now changed.
The East and the West have come once for all into intimate contact on a vast scale. Each feels the necessity for mutual understanding and even for assimilating whatever in the other is true and useful. This need to understand is no longer a matter of mere intellectual curiosity but of survival.
The eastern and western minds need to be integrated. It has been asserted and is still being maintained today that each has a different kind of soul. But if the two are to be integrated, we have to assume a deeper soul comprehending the manifest souls of both.
This common soul must always have been, without either component being conscious of its presence. The encompassing soul has to be discovered and understood; and in its terms the separate souls have to be reappraised. There have been works useful for the study of comparative philosophy, such as source books, treatises on philosophical beginnings, separate histories, evaluations of cultures, and some syntheses.
However, they have not presented the philosophical traditions with a unified perspective from which they can be studied comparatively. Comparative philosophy must have a philosophical aim. Only when the aim is clarified can the work be given a definite shape.
The aim has to illuminate the perspective; then the traditions thrown into perspective take on a definite meaning and significance. The aim of comparative philosophy is the elucidation of the nature of man and his environment in order that a comprehensive philosophy of life and a plan for thought and action may be obtained.The Journal is dedicated to publishing quality articles and reviews of books in Chinese philosophy, particularly those relating Chinese philosophy to other philosophical traditions in the world, including but not limited to Western philosophy, Islamic philosophy, African philosophy, Indian philosophy, Japanese philosophy, and Korean philosophy, as well as articles on theories and methodologies of comparative philosophy.
All articles are peer-reviewed. In addition to high-quality research articles on comparative philosophy, theory and methodology, Dao publishes book reviews in the area of Chinese and comparative philosophy. This is the only journal that regularly publishes reviews of books in Chinese, as well as full-length articles reviewing works of contemporary philosophers in China.
Issue 1, March As a result of the significant disruption that is being caused by the COVID pandemic we are very aware that many researchers will have difficulty in meeting the timelines associated with our peer review process during normal times. Please do let us know if you need additional time. Our systems will continue to remind you of the original timelines but we intend to be highly flexible at this time.
Download the Dao Product Flyer which outlines the benefits of publishing your research with us. The award winners will also be noted on this website. The best essay is selected in terms of the scholarly rigorousness and philosophical creativity. Rights and permissions. Springer policies. Relates Chinese philosophy to other traditions Explores the relationship between Chinese philosophy and other Asian philosophies —Indian, Japanese and Korean Compares Chinese with African and Islamic philosophy Presents book reviews, including books in Chinese Reviews the works of contemporary Chinese philosophers.
Latest issue. Volume 19 Issue 1, March View all volumes and issues. Is Zhuangzi a Wanton?
Comparative Philosophy: Western, Indian, And Chinese Philosophies Compared
This journal has 14 open access articles. View all articles. Journal updates COVID and impact on peer review As a result of the significant disruption that is being caused by the COVID pandemic we are very aware that many researchers will have difficulty in meeting the timelines associated with our peer review process during normal times. Download Product Flyer Download the Dao Product Flyer which outlines the benefits of publishing your research with us. Click here to see all winners.
Explore Online first articles Volumes and issues Sign up for alerts. Taxes will be calculated during checkout. Electronic ISSN Print ISSN